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THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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REGINALD WALTER MACAN*

1848—1941

By Sir William Beveridge, Master of University College, Oxford.

1848 to 1941—that is the stretch of time which we survey in thinking of the remarkable man whose life and work we are here to rejoice in and to commemorate. What a stretch of time it is! To-day it is inevitable that we should begin by thinking of it in terms of war. Reginald Walter Macan was born on the 1st April, 1848. When Sevastopol fell in the Crimean War he was eight years old. Nearly all boys of eight are charming; what a devastatingly charming urchin this particular boy must have been! He witnessed, as an undergraduate, the Franco-German War of 1870; and in his full vigour the South African War of 1899. The first World War of 1914-18 came as a break in his magnificent reign as Master here and as an occasion of personal loss, for his elder son was killed as a Captain in France. And last, he had seen the world plunged into this second storm. In that stretch of ninety-three years Macan saw the birth of what was thought to be an era of Free Trade and international goodwill—and he had seen it end. He had seen Oxford revolutionized by three successive Commissions, of 1870, 1877 and 1919, and after every revolution remaining in essentials unchanged. For aspiring, generous youth of all generations is

*A commemoration address delivered in the Chapel, University College, Oxford, on March 29, 1941.

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much the same, from whatever homes and schools it comes, and the service of youth and the vocation of learning are the same in free lands from one century to another.

Reginald Walter Macan, born in 1848, received his school education first at St. Columba's and then as a boy in *Verites* at Charterhouse — a great foundation with which in this place we have so many connections, old and new. But his was a different Charterhouse from that of to-day—it was the Charterhouse of Thackeray—in its old home at Smithfield, years before it moved to the Surrey hills, not the Charterhouse of younglings like the Rector of Lincoln and the Regius Professor of Medicine and myself. Entering the University of Oxford first as a Commoner at Christ Church, Macan migrated after a term on election to a Classical Scholarship to this College. After graduating with great distinction he returned to Christ Church as Senior Student and Tutor, holding that post until 1882. Then he married, and under the old Statutes — an episode reminding us that in one way at least our University has changed — he vacated his Studentship. How whole-heartedly we in this place must rejoice that a marriage which gave him so much happiness, and made him the radiating centre of so much happiness for a growing circle, was also the means of bringing him back to us. For after joining for a short while yet a third College — Brasenose — as lecturer, he was elected Fellow and Tutor of this College in 1884. With us he remained for nearly forty years on active service, first as Fellow and Tutor till 1906, and then as Master—the obvious and certain choice of those who knew him best—from 1906 to 1923. That office he vacated at the age of 75, at about the time when the youngest of those young men whom it is now my duty to call for National Service were being born. During these last eighteen years, living in the neighbourhood of Oxford, he was far from living in retirement. One of his books, *The Collects of the Christian Year*, a set of translations into Latin, medieval and classical, was the product of his 80th year. Nor did he let himself become the prisoner of a narrowing circle. He had learnt to drive that new-fangled toy, the motor-car, at an age when most men to-day are beginning to think that they ought perhaps to give it up; he continued to preserve his freedom to take him to Oxford and elsewhere when he wanted, in

that way, till near the end of his life. Everyone of us must have memories of joyful gatherings to which he thus conveyed himself and where he inevitably became the centre of attraction, the life and soul of fellowship. A good many will recall one occasion on which he came back to this College three years ago for an official purpose. On that occasion three previous Masters of the College met with me to open the Library, whose reconstruction commemorates the great services of my predecessor, Dr. Poynton, over a period of years as great as that of Macan himself. On that day the oldest of the three old Masters appeared the youngest also.

Reginald Walter Macan was a master of those classical studies which have been the glory of this University in the past. He made a notable contribution to learning in his edition of Herodotus, of which one part appeared in 1895 and the other in 1908—five volumes in all. A characteristic note in his Preface describes this as 'addressed to the friends of Hellenic Studies, accomplished through long years, amid many conflicting duties . . . purely for its own sake and as a debt of honour to the University of Oxford which laid silently upon me an obligation to diminish, so far as in my power lay, the reproach, perhaps a trifle antiquated—of sterility, still too often levelled against her resident sons.' Against him the charge of sterility would be not so much antiquated as absurd. Among many minor writings two other works deserve special mention. One is the collection of translations into Latin which I have mentioned already—the lines which you see on the sheet in your hands are what he wrote for our Feast Day, of St. Simon and St. Jude.[1] The other is a volume of memories of Oxford in the seventies.

[1] *PRO fundamentis tuae,*
Conditor, ecclesiae
aedificasti viros,
Prophetas, Apostolos,
angularis queis foret
lapis Christus scilicet.

Quorum doctrinae fides
faciat nos habiles,
ipsos templum condere
Tibi acceptabile,
uno cunctos animo
coniunctos in Domino.

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I must not omit to mention, however briefly, some other facets of this many-sided man. Classic and historian by profession, he was a metaphysician and theologian by interest, a protagonist in the Modern Churchmen's Movement. In his younger days a fine singer, he was versed in all the great musical works of the last three centuries. He continually wrote English verses of distinction. Inevitably, he played a significant part in the larger whole of the University as Reader in Ancient History from 1890 to 1910 and as a member of the Hebdomadal Council from 1892 to 1914.

But though in learned contributions to classical studies, and in the University, the man whom we commemorate played his full part, we in this Chapel to-day must think first and foremost of his unrivalled services to our College. Upon the foundation of his twenty-two years as Fellow and Tutor followed, as I have said, seventeen years as Master. The first part of those seventeen years, until war came, will be acknowledged by all who know the College as the greatest period in the history of the College in modern times, when it shone with equal lustre in every field of activity — of learning and athletic prowess and intellectual ferment. The great Master whom we commemorate to-day needs no further testimony as to what he did for this foundation. It would be idle to waste words in embellishing this achievement and that of the united group of Fellows and Tutors who he led and fathered. He was able to do this because, notable as he was in the field of learning, outstanding as a member of the College and then its leading figure, more notable still was his personality. Of this I could speak from my relatively brief memory : he did not need time to impress himself upon those whom he met. But I prefer to repeat to you what has just been said of him to me by one who was his pupil, friend and colleague :

> ' A man of singular good looks, he had the irrepressible gaiety and humour of his Irish parentage. His carriage was dignified, his manner urbane and affectionate, his conversation full of worldly wisdom, his voice well able to give effect to his eloquent periods. The singular unity and friendliness which characterises our Common Room is due in great measure to his presence and his unconscious example. He never thought or spoke evil of his neighbour, he never swerved from the rule of justice which he had inherited from his father and mother and from his early training and association. Moreover, and this all members of this University and of his College will perhaps most vividly

remember to-day, he was the most hospitable of hosts; his house was graced by a talented hostess, and was almost a second home to those who gained his affection. But yesterday we might have said truly of his, as was said of Nestor, *μετὰ δὲ τριτάτοισιν ἄνασσεν* He towered among men and women of this third generation, and yet to the end he retained the charm and freshness of a gifted boy.'

Reginald Walter Macan was one of those who refuse to grow old, or while living to retire from life. He was the embodiment of the spirit expressed more than two thousand years ago in the words which Antigone of Sophocles uses to her sister Ismene, who is reproaching her for being in love with the impossible, for attempting things beyond her strength:

οὐκοῦν, ὅταν δὴ μὴ σθένω, πεπαύσομαι

('Well, when, indeed, I have no strength, I shall have ceased.')

Reginald Walter Macan, his strength wearing beautifully and flawlessly thinner with the passage of years, has ceased to breathe. He has not ceased, he cannot cease to live, in his work and in our memories and in the gratitude of those who will hereafter come to this College and the University, so long as the University and the College shall stand here, for the service of youth and for the ministry of learning.

IN MEMORIAM

By The Editor.

With the death of Dr. Macan the Modern Churchmen's Movement has lost one of its giants. He was of the stature of Hastings Rashdall, J. M. Wilson, B. H. Streeter, F. C. Burkitt, M. G. Glazebrook, R. B. Tollinton, Percy Gardner, R. H. Charles and many other distinguished laymen and clergymen to whom our movement owes so much.

The achievements of his long and varied life, and the impression which he made on his academic contemporaries, are delightfully presented in the Commemoration Address by Sir William Beveridge which we are privileged to publish in this issue. Here we shall only refer to him as an English Churchman of broad sympathies and modern outlook who did his part as a layman in trying to promote the spirit and ideal of modern

or liberal churchmanship, when and where opportunity offered, during his long life.

As an Oxford undergraduate in the late 'sixties he came under the influence of the Liberal movement in the University on its philosophical and religious side, particularly as represented by T. H. Green. His mind turned towards Holy Orders, but the intellectual difficulties proved to be too great. In 1873 he accepted a Hibbert Travelling Studentship and spent the next two years in German University circles. He was deeply influenced by the theological, philosophical and artistic spirit of the liberal Germany of those days, not yet dominated by Prussianism. In Germany he wrote an essay entitled *The Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, well worth reading even to-day, although much which modern criticism of the Gospels has revealed was then unknown. The essay is essentially scientific in its method and fearlessness, being inspired by the authority of truth and nothing but the truth. The spirit of the conclusion is expressed in the following citation from its Preface :

> 'The time is still, it seems to the writer, distant when the effects of what is called "modern thought" upon life as a whole will be manifest. In the present meanwhile, for those interested in theoretical work, is not a fearless and liberal intelligence as great a blessing as for others a creed with all the majesty of old traditions, and all the consolation of supernatural promises?'

The publication of this essay[1] in 1877 deprived Macan of the confidence and favour of some of the most influential of the Canons of Christ Church, particularly Dr. Pusey, and this led to his severance from that great foundation in 1881. His estimate of the religious situation in his Oxford environment at this time is most interestingly presented in his essay, 'Oxford in the Seventies' :[2]

> In 1873 Matthew Arnold, then Professor of Poetry, in his *Literature and Dogma*, 'had been trying to persuade us that Literature and Dogma were incompatibles : and the Vatican Decrees of 1871, with their *reductio ad absurdum* of ecclesiastical authority, had brought some at least among us to see that, while Mr. Gladstone's fulminations on the civil and political aspects of Vaticanism might leave us comparatively cold, there was, on Church principles, no logical alter-

[1] *The Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, by Reginald W. Macan, M.A. (Williams and Norgate, 1877. 6*s*.)

[2] *The Eighteen-Seventies*. (Cambridge University Press, 1929. 12*s*. 6*d*. net.)

native between Papal infallibility and freedom of thought; and to hope that Anglican loyalties might prove to be reconcilable with philosophic autonomy. But the leaders of the Church party in Oxford at that time were not prepared to agree with the apostle of culture, while they were in the way with him: much less with the champions of science, whose First Principles were certainly still in a rather agnostic, not to say unspiritual, stage of development.

But the leaders were by that time hardly abreast of their followers in the University regarding either Apologetics or academic policy. Younger men, destined to succeed them, soon showed themselves willing to accept loyally the *fait accompli* in the abolition of tests, to admit the Higher Criticism at least as applied to the Old Testament, and to promote the cause of Natural Science, without undue nervousness, fortified as some of them were by the Idealist philosophy, which Green was bringing home to Oxford to supersede the scepticism of the earlier Tractarians, and to replace the sensationalism of Mill and Bain.'

Although Macan retained a life-long interest in theology and philosophy and was a frequent attendant at courses of lectures delivered in the University on these subjects, he henceforth abandoned their formal study and settled down to classical research and to tutorial and college duties.

After he had become Master of University College in 1906, he became interested in the endeavours of the Modernist Movement and later joined the M.C.U., becoming one of its Vice-Presidents and a frequent attendant at our Annual Conferences. On the occasion of the notable Christological Conference held at Girton in 1921, he contributed on the last evening of its sessions the following poem entitled 'Holy Communion':

'We in Him, and He in us,
dwelling now and evermore,
God and man united thus
with the Faithful we adore.

With the Faithful—and beyond
deepest depth and highest height
Spirits each to each respond,
Finite unto Infinite:

through the Christ, whose Body we
build, and bless, and break, and eat,
meekly kneeling, lovingly,
here before the Mercy-seat.

He in us, and we in Him,
dwelling now and evermore,
with the radiant Cherubim
God in glory we adore.'

When we lost from our ranks that most promising theologian, Cyril Emmet, Fellow of University College and Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall, Macan delivered the memorial address[3] at the unveiling of the tablet to his memory in Ripon Hall chapel. On that occasion, in speaking of Emmet's modernism, he revealed to his auditors his own conception of the nature of Christian Modernism and its task:

> 'But it cannot be too clearly understood that Modernism—a somewhat vague and elastic term which Emmet nevertheless accepted as a description of his own method of study and teaching—covers and carries with it a new apologetic. Modernism is not a religion, it is a defence of religion, and of the Christian religion: it is an attempt, so to speak, to bring the Christian apology up to date. That is, at any rate, what it is and will be in Ripon Hall: and what it was with your first Vice-Principal. Naturally there is room in Modernism for considerable varieties and divergences of theological positions, and of religious experience. . . . It is the rare and almost unique prerogative of our English branch of the Catholic Church to leave its children—at least the adult laity—virtually unrestricted intellectual liberty, combined with the use of a noble liturgy, and a wide range of devotional practice and aids to faith. If our Church has not seen its way to dispense altogether with doctrinal or what I should call rationalistic tests for its priests, yet in practice our clergy enjoy a freedom not much inferior to that of their lay brethren, and, to do them bare justice, often render a much better account of it. This liberty makes such characters and services as Emmet's possible: and this Hall exists (I take it) to foster and promote the conditions favourable to the development and multiplication of such ministers of the Church and servants of humanity as he was—faithful, it may be, in few things, but worthy to be entrusted with many things—who shall unite in their own lives, as pastors and fishers of men, the prophetic with the priestly office, in however humble an *Imitatio Christi*.'

Macan was at this time a Governor of Ripon Hall, and it is by no means easy to express the greatness of its debt to him. He took the liveliest interest in its welfare and gave it the most unstinted service. When it became necessary, on account of the extension of the Bodleian, to remove from the site opposite Wadham, it was Macan who initiated its transfer to its present spacious position on Boar's Hill. When Bishop Burge, who was Warden of Ripon Hall, died—one of Macan's pupils—it was at Macan's suggestion that another of his old pupils, Dr. Strong, should be invited to succeed to the Wardenship.

A dauntless protagonist for dogmatic freedom, Macan was in his own life a standing example of the way in which humble

[3] Published in the *Modern Churchman*, February, 1925.

piety and an unflinching devotion to duty can unite in that service of God which is perfect freedom.

Indeed freedom in the Church, and especially for the clergy both in their faith and in their expositions of Christian doctrine, he believed to be of supreme importance. This point is stressed more than once in his notable essay *Religious Changes in Oxford during the last Fifty Years*:[4]

> 'Personally I am not an advocate of the Policy of Disestablishment . . . my ideal for the Churches . . . is still a Ministry as free as the laity, a Ministry without pseudo-scientific reservations or commitments. Let the Churches learn intellectual freedom and honesty of the Universities. Teachers under tests are in a false position—a position, I will not say of immorality, but of a lower morality. . . .'
>
> '. . . subscriptions and tests and creeds and articles and declarations and confessions of belief and impeachments, prosecutions, and penalties, have not succeeded in stifling a certain Liberty of Prophesying. . . .'
>
> 'Theology cannot afford to remain for ever under the suspicion of mental servitude and of moral cowardice in a society otherwise dedicated to Liberty and Truth.'

It is not strange that so loyal and gifted a son of the Church of England, holding fast to this ideal, should have remained a layman.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Liturgical Irregularities and their Remedy.

When Dean Inge was asked whether he was interested in Liturgiology, he replied, 'No; neither do I collect postage stamps.' There, he spoke like the ordinary English layman. The only time when the ordinary English layman becomes interested in Liturgiology—the ritual (*i.e.* the words) and ceremonial (*i.e.* the action) of public worship—is when his clergyman makes alterations in the services of his parish church. The layman's interest then takes the form of irritation and protest, usually concluding with abstention from church attendance. With the clergy it is otherwise: their interest in Liturgiology has been stimulated in their theological colleges, where they learn how closely the forms of public worship are interwoven

[4] A paper read before the Oxford Society for Historical Theology, June 14, 1917. (Oxford University Press. 1*s*. 6*d*. Second Impression.)

with the Church's doctrine and the Church's history. This is proper enough since they are to be leaders in public worship. But it is hopeless to expect the bulk of the laity to share their interest in this matter. We are sure that the more simple and natural public worship is, the more attractive and helpful it will prove to be to ordinary laymen. Hence we are conscious that to treat a liturgical conflict in these pages must be dull and distasteful to non-clerical readers. Our excuse is that the matter is of some importance.

We all remember the conflict in Parliament about the Deposited Book of 1928, when after two debates of extraordinary interest and quality in the House of Commons the Revised Prayer Book was rejected, chiefly because of the alterations which it made in the Holy Communion service. The bulk of the English Episcopate who had supported the Deposited Book was deeply offended at being thus flouted by Parliament, and illegally sanctioned the Deposited Book instead of modifying it and bringing it before Parliament for the third time. The main purpose of the bishops in so acting was to restrict within wide limits the ceremonial and ritual deviations from the Book of Common Prayer of 1662—our legal Prayer Book. This episcopal policy has proved to be a dismal failure. Romanizing practices which had given such offence to the English laity have not been successfully curbed even by the strongest of our episcopal disciplinarians. What the bishops have found most difficult to prevent is the secretive and silent 'farcing' of the English Holy Communion service by prayers and petitions derived from the Roman Mass, combined of course with the Roman ceremonial. This is so serious an act of disloyalty that even the *Church Times* affirms in its leading article of March 28, 1941 :

> 'We hold no brief whatever for the long demoded practice of supplementing Cranmer with the Congregation of Rites.'

As there are some hundreds, probably some thousands, of English churches in which this is being done, the practice can hardly be called 'demoded.' But we suppose the *Church Times* is using the word 'demoded' in the sense in which our Anglo-Catholic brethren apply it to Modernism.

There is, however, another kind of irregularity practised in our English Communion service which arouses pained and con-

temptuous protest from the *Church Times*. It is the 'farcing' of the Holy Communion service of 1662 with passages from the Holy Communion service of 1928, particularly the introduction of the *epiclesis*. Of the *epiclesis* the *Church Times* truly writes (in the leading article to which we have already referred):

> 'Most of the laity, we suspect, are quite uncertain whether an *epiclesis* is a form of prayer or an article of apparel.'

To the *Church Times*, however, it is a most painful innovation, and that because many, many centuries ago it was deliberately excised from the Canon of the Roman Mass. This *epiclesis*, or the invocation of the Holy Spirit to bless the bread and wine for their sacramental purpose, existed in all the Primitive Church liturgies,[1] and was introduced by Archbishop Cranmer into the Holy Communion service of the *First Prayer Book of King Edward VI* (1549). It disappeared from the *Second Prayer Book of King Edward VI* and all subsequent revisions of the English Prayer Book until 1928.

Many of our clergy are now attached to it, and although the use of it may be illegal in our services, it is not disloyal, for it does not conflict in any way with the eucharistic doctrine of the Church of England. Nevertheless the *Church Times*, which has no sympathy for 'petty liturgical pilfering' (leading article, March 7) where the *epiclesis* is concerned, and is painfully contemptuous of the Holy Communion office of 1928, sees in this irregularity an occasion for demanding a new revision of the Holy Communion office. This plea is in part based upon recent reflections published by the Bishop of Oxford, Dr. Kirk, in his *Oxford Diocesan Magazine*. What the *Church Times* desires is the abolition of alternative Communion Offices (1662 and 1928) and the authorization of a new rite. Modern Churchmen are not entirely satisfied with the Communion Offices of 1662 and 1928. They however use them loyally, recognizing that in this matter they are officiating ministers, not private individuals. But are they likely to find the new rite which the *Church Times* desires to see authorized more congenial than the two existing rites? Charles II remarked to his brother James, 'The English people will not get rid of me in order to make you King.'

[1] In Bishop Sarapion's Prayer Book (4th century) we have the *epiclesis* or Invocation of the Word, not the Invocation of the Holy Spirit.

We are unable to agree with the *Church Times*' policy, and for the following reasons. We are convinced that the policy of alternative rites which received the sanction of Church, though not of Parliament, in 1928 was on sound lines. The rite of 1662 is still highly valued by the majority of practising Church people : the new rite of 1928 has also won the high appreciation of a number of the clergy, but not perhaps of so many of the laity. What we need, however, is a further extension of the policy of alternative rites. Modernists certainly stand in need of a rite nearer to their hearts' desire. This is shewn by the wide appreciation of the Harborne rite, produced by Canon R. D. Richardson. While Modernists feel that this revision was on right lines, especially in seeking to eliminate from our Communion Office the expiatory conception of Christ's sacrifice, there are many Modernists who desire a service more simple and creative and less controlled by traditional ideals and phraseology.

If our Anglo-Catholic brethren are willing whole-heartedly to concede this practice of alternative rites, and to allow the Modernists their rite among the other rites, we should be quite willing that Anglo-Catholics should on those terms be granted the authorization of a Eucharistic rite nearer their hearts' desire than that provided by the rites of 1662 and 1928. Is it not possible for Anglo-Catholics, in obedience to the urgent need of increasing both the influence and the comprehensiveness of the English Church, to agree to this policy?

We may add that to our mind there should be only two limitations to the policy of the implementing of alternative rites. First, that only such rites shall be used in our services as have received the sanction of the central Church authority; and, secondly, that such rites should only be used in parish churches where and when they have also received the approval of the representatives of the parochial laity.

Practical Modernism and the M.C.U.

In our March issue we published an article on 'The Future of the Modern Churchmen's Union' by its Organizing Secretary. There will be general agreement with the future policy there suggested. That policy may be summed up in the phrase,

'Practice, not Theory.' This does not mean that practice is to take the place of theory, but that what Modernist theory has achieved should now be put into practice. Again, it is not to be supposed that something of this sort has not been going on for years — far from it. Although the M.C.U. is largely lay in its membership, the number of practical Modernist priests has been not inconsiderable. Their modernist lights in many cases have been hidden under a bushel because one of the factors in effective parochial modernism is not to advertise it as Modernism : *Summa ars est celare artem.* The most notable example of this was seen in the ministry of the late Dick Sheppard, but there have been not a few others as faithful though not so famous, and we believe their numbers to be steadily on the increase.

Another Modernist activity consists in the production and publication of Modernist manuals containing modern and simple expositions of Christian doctrine : popular expositions of the Scriptures in the light of modern research : manuals of prayer : collections of hymns for congregational use : modern and helpful expositions of the Christian sacraments and ordinances : the practical treatment of moral problems concerned with marriage, etc. Perhaps only those intimately connected with the working of the Modernist Movement are aware of the great contribution which has been made by Modernists in this sphere for some years past. This, like parochial activity, is an unending task for modern-minded pastors.

Then there is another sphere of modernist work. It is concerned with the training of ordinands for the Ministry. There is a very wide and influential field here to be tilled, and not only by the tutors and chaplains of theological colleges, but also by the parochial clergy in trying to turn the minds of promising young men towards the Christian Ministry as deserving of their life service. The modernist laity who desire a modernist clergy would perhaps find the financial support of work in this field more fruitful of results than in any other.

The Colonial and Foreign Mission fields provide scope here for modernist Christian endeavour, and we may add that the number of modern-minded missionaries working in the wide fields throughout the British Empire and beyond it is much greater than is usually supposed. But here again the wisdom of

the serpent—a phrase derived from Christ's teaching—demands that the term Modernist shall never be used.

Again, a new opportunity is arising for the Church of England in this land, and indeed for all other Christian denominations, in the domain of national Christian education. Here we are sure that great multitudes of school teachers, male and female, if they are to undertake to teach the Christian religion, will only be got to do so if they are permitted and encouraged to teach it on modernist lines. In our Church training colleges, and through the educational magazines read by all professionally alert teachers, competent modernists ought to be seeking to promote and implement their ideals and methods.

In the popular Press, and not least by judicious and practical letters in its correspondence columns, modernists can find another sphere for fruitful activity. Dean Inge's articles in the evening papers have done much to make the Christian religion intellectually respectable, not to say morally acceptable, in the eyes of many men in the street who had come to regard Christian claims with indifference, if not with contempt.

It would be hard to estimate the contribution of the B.B.C. to Christian Modernism. It is not only the enlightened teaching of enlightened modernists like the present Dean of St. Paul's which the public receives in a most direct manner through the wireless, but also the indirect modernist teaching conveyed through the admirable devotional services which it broadcasts.

So much for the many-sided activities of individual modernists of every degree which are being carried on to-day. In almost all cases these activities can be and are carried on without the aid of the M.C.U. In earlier days, as a corporate activity, the M.C.U. did much by its influential publicity to stimulate, and in some cases to originate, these activities, but that stage is past. The seed has been sown and the plants which have sprung from it are now bearing seed of themselves. Modernism is shaping and will go on shaping the form of the Christian convictions, ideals and activities of every Christian communion, and of many non-Christian individuals, in increasing measure as the years go by. It has already secured *Lebensraum*—some would even say, a place in the sun.

But what about the M.C.U.? Has it no particular task to

perform in addition to the part it may be playing in this general modernist movement? Here, it seemed to us, that perhaps the article in our last month's issue was not sufficiently clear and practical. We all, of course, agree with the aims of the M.C.U. as set forth in its articles of membership, although some of us would like to see them expressed with more brevity and clarity. What we are particularly concerned with at present is how best in existing circumstances to implement those aims. Here the M.C.U. ought to exhibit powers of leadership, especially where the issues are difficult and conflicting. But it is here that we seem to find it lacking. Has it got a policy in these cases? No, it will be replied. It has no policy, because to have a policy is not its business. It is concerned with aims and ideals. Quite so. But these aims and ideals, having been widely published and widely accepted — consciously, or more often unconsciously — many interested people will not feel it worth while to continue their membership of the M.C.U., or induce others to join that society, unless it is going to concern itself with the strenuous implementing of its aims. We have reached a stage when our main concern is not ideals but methods, *i.e.* methods by which our ideals may be practically realized in our existing environment. To give examples.

The primary aim of the M.C.U. is to affirm the need for the fearless and faithful teaching of Christian truth. This has an important bearing upon our traditional Christian creeds, and our use of them. There are many modern-minded Christians who feel that some of the statements, for instance in the Apostles' Creed, are not true, and that other statements are doubtful. What does the M.C.U. propose to do about it? Is it to be satisfied with allowing things to remain as they are, notwithstanding the charges brought against modern-minded clergymen that they are dishonest when they recite such creeds although unable to accept some of their clauses as literally true? Will the M.C.U. support the policy of pressing our Church authorities to provide, in addition, an alternative Confession of Faith more in harmony with modern Christian convictions and more suitable for teaching young people the essential truths of our religion? We think it is the duty of the M.C.U. to come to some positive conclusion here, and to act upon it.

To take another instance. The M.C.U. stands for fostering fellowship and co-operation in Word and Sacrament with other Christian societies. At present the cause of reunion seems to many to be held up by a Church policy which places intercommunion as the last stage, instead of the first stage, in the policy of reuniting sectarian denominations in this land. Which of these two methods does the M.C.U. stand for? We are of opinion that the M.C.U. ought to have a policy here: to have an aim is not enough.

National religious education has come into the foreground. We all of us, in common with our Christian brethren of every denomination, whether traditionalist or modernist, are agreed about the value of, and need for, a great national effort in this sphere. But here again we think the M.C.U. may have a special contribution to make, particularly in the matter of 'agreed syllabuses.' Certainly it is advisable that an effort should be made to secure a consensus of modernist experience and judgement which might contribute, if accepted by authority, to the success of this great national endeavour. We will not now cite examples of other problems which seem to us to demand the service of M.C.U. experience and leadership—but they are many.

While we accept with all thankfulness the contribution made by the Doctrinal Report in support of the theological comprehensiveness of the Church of England, and the protection of the spirit of freedom both of research and of utterance within her borders, we ought not to regard its contribution as something which possesses either stability or finality until it be implemented in the form of many-sided dogmatic and liturgical reforms. Thankfulness for it there should be, but not that expressed in the words of the Psalmist, 'Turn again unto thy rest, oh my soul, for the Lord hath rewarded thee'; but rather the thankfulness of him who, having received a gift, seeks to discover how best he may use it: 'Lord, what wilt thou have me to *do*?'

ORGANIZED CATHOLICISM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

By A. C. Bouquet, D.D., Vicar of All Saints', Cambridge.

I PROPOSE in this article to consider three small books,* *The Catholic Church and the Roman Church* by Richard Haldane, *Jesuit Truth* by G. G. Coulton, and *Unity in the Truth* by A. G. Hebert, each of which in its own way illustrates the curious weakness of organized Catholicism where freedom is concerned. This weakness appears to be a cultural inheritance from continental life which has somehow intruded itself into Christianity.

Mr. Haldane's short volume shows briefly and effectively that the Roman Church is now unquestionably controlled by Italians, and is therefore, in spite of its size, genuinely sectarian, and not Catholic. Even the Anglican Communion, in spite of its preponderance of English-speaking clergy and laity, is more ecumenically minded and governed. Whatever the prestige of Lambeth, the Anglican conception of Church polity is Cyprianic and conciliar. But eighty per cent. of the officials at the Vatican are Italian, and it is the Vatican which is in control of the Roman communion. Now no Italian bishop can be appointed who is not favourable to Mussolini, and no leader of the Youth Group of Catholic Action in Italy can be appointed unless he is a Fascist. In America and Australia the attempt is being made by means of Papal delegates, all Italians, and sometimes speaking very poor English, to control the Roman bishops in those countries (who are mostly Irish). This can only mean the attempt to place all Christians who are in communion with the see of Rome under the control of an ecclesiastical dictatorship which is itself dependent for its existence upon one of the two leaders of

* (1) *The Catholic Church and the Roman Church* (How Italians Corrupted the Faith), by Richard Haldane. (A. H. Stockwell Ltd., London. 98 pp. 2*s*. net. 1940.)

(2) *Jesuit Truth*, by G. G. Coulton, Litt.D. (Barnicott's Ltd., Taunton. 132 pp. 6*d*. paper. 1940.)

(3) *Unity in the Truth*, by the Rev. A. G. Hebert, S.S.M. (S.P.C.K., London. 57 pp. 1*s*. net, paper. 1939.)

'The New Order' in Europe, and it is bound to stifle all honest thought. But the position is not new. Newman, writing long ago, declared: 'I have never seen the principle, the encouragement of the true scientific spirit and disinterested love of truth, seriously adopted on the Continent by any Catholic periodical, or by any group of Catholics.'

Dr. Coulton, whose tenacity in argument is now world-famous, shows from another angle this fatal weakness. In order to clear away misunderstanding, he recently set out fifteen points, all supporting the allegations that the Roman Church is the fullest example of a Totalitarian State, and that it would use corporal penalties upon all baptized persons if necessary, whether actually in communion with it or not, supposing that it gained the power to do so. He then submitted his thesis to Mgr. R. A. Knox, and asked him to controvert it. Mgr. Knox failed to reply. Dr. Coulton then published the fifteen propositions in a quarterly magazine, and further, since that magazine accidentally ceased publication before any answer was possible, he offered to print at his own expense the objections of any qualified critic. He was taken up by the editor of the *Catholic Herald*, who referred him to the Bellarmine Society, which has its *habitat* in the Jesuit College of Heythrop, Chipping Norton, and which, so he was told, makes a speciality of replying to controversialists. Dr. Coulton agreed to communicate with this body, but after keeping him waiting fifty-two days for a decision, it only accepted his challenge with a qualification, *i.e.* the proviso that there must be no publication of the debate records unless this had first been agreed to by the Society itself. Dr. Coulton naturally could not accept such a proviso. A wearisome correspondence then ensued, during which the Bellarmine Society declared that it had prepared an answer to the fifteen points but could only consent to its publication on condition that two-thirds of Dr. Coulton's magazine article should not be reprinted, and that certain other matters — such as Mgr. Knox's failure to reply — should be excluded from any preface contributed by Dr. Coulton. The latter felt that such conditions amounted to a demand for a *suppressio veri* to which he could not in honesty agree, since it would have deprived the educated public of the full facts leading up to the controversy. He there-

fore took the step of printing the whole correspondence, leaving the Bellarmine Society to publish their 'answer' to the fifteen points in the columns of the *Catholic Herald*.

Some will think that he missed an opportunity by insisting on the whole loaf, and that it might have been better to secure the chance of tackling the Bellarmine Society in the open by surrendering the supplementary advantage of being able to confound Mgr. Knox. Anyhow, Dr. Coulton thought otherwise. He was not prepared to lend himself to a suppression which he felt no doubt would have imperilled his reputation as a truthful historian. He is—not without justification—relentlessly suspicious of Roman Catholic controversialists, and will now hew them in pieces without mercy, even though they may act (as doubtless they may sometimes) without *arrière pensée*. But in spite of this, it seems lamentably clear that in discussions of this kind Roman Catholic writers appear at their very worst, since their assumption of the theory involved in Cardinal Billot's treatise, *i.e.* that there are two measures of truth, is in essence exactly the same as that of Nazi and Fascist ideologists with regard to the administration of justice ('*We* alone are right, and our party must therefore at all times be allowed freedom. Our opponents are wrong, and therefore must be denied it').

Now fundamentally this is precisely the point which, unconsciously no doubt, operates at the back of Father Hebert's mind. He is considering a proposal to extend the South Indian Reunion scheme to Churches in this country, and he discusses it with great charity and courtesy from the standpoint of a convinced Anglo-Catholic. Father Hebert is concerned at the existence, within the various bodies concerned, of elements which he calls 'Liberal-Modernist.' These elements are uncongenial to him, and he is logical enough to see that their existence greatly complicates any proposals for reunion, since all traditionalist formularies are equally vulnerable to their criticisms. He therefore (p. 38) implies that he considers it justifiable to protect the simple-minded against teaching which is 'heretical.' He does not necessarily approve of the *Index* and other methods employed by Rome, but he plainly thinks something of the kind to be needed because 'the Gospel, being a Gospel, must come with authority.' Let me quote again (p. 37):

> 'But then, it may be asked, ought we not to have confidence that the orthodox doctrine would prevail, owing to its instrinsic superiority? If the orthodox doctrine is regarded as needing preferential treatment and "protection," is not that an admission that it is unable to maintain itself on equal terms? The objection may seem plausible, but it rests on a misconception of the nature of the Church. The Church is being treated as if it were an academy or a debating society; faith is being treated as if it were simply a man's opinion on theological subjects. But actually the Church claims to be based on a Divine work of salvation, and to be responsible for proclaiming a Divine Gospel to men. It must speak with authority, because this Gospel is from God; it must exclude heretical teaching, because that is the perversion of the Gospel into something which is not a Gospel, and therefore cuts away the very basis on which the Church stands.'

In effect, Catholic Christianity is the only true revealed religion. Therefore all other forms of religion, including non-Catholic Christianity, being inferior, and even false, need not and should not be granted the opportunity for free discussion. The public ought to be protected against them, and to be saved the fatigue and danger of having to decide for itself in favour of the truth. Let us therefore take a short way with our opponents, and suppress the possibility of the public making acquaintance with what they teach.

Now this leads logically to precisely the position indicated above: 'We alone are right, etc.' Let us put this side by side with two quotations from Dr. Oman:

> (i) 'The Gospels persist in being a witness from truth seen to truth seen, to which external authority is alien. . . . The interest of the prophetic revelation is perennial: first because, as it deals with human experience, it is empirical, in a way which speaks to all experience; and second, because it sets up the final order as freedom in knowing the Lord by our own insight and accepting His rule as our own legislation, an order which we may hope is nearer, but which can never be overpassed. And just because the Gospels are most of all concerned with this liberty of the children of God, they have in them their own witness.'

> (ii) 'There is only one right way of asking men to believe, and that is to put before them what they ought to believe because it is true; and there is only one right way of persuading, and that is to present what is true in such a way that nothing will prevent it from being seen except the desire to abide in darkness; and there is only one further way of helping them, which is to point out what they are cherishing that is opposed to faith. When all this has been done, it is still necessary to recognise that faith is God's gift, not our handiwork; of His manifestation of the truth by life, not of our demonstration by argument or of our impressing by eloquence; and that even He is willing to fail till He can have the only success love could value — personal acceptance of the truth *simply because it is seen to be true.*' (Italics mine.)

There is the choice. We cannot have it both ways. If Oman is right, the only way Christians can properly recognize and accept revelation (whether public or private—and all revelation begins by being private) is by a series of tests, by certain *preambula fidei*, which demonstrate truth to us, and not by passive submission to authority in a sacrifice of the intellect. It is true that our wits are themselves given and ordered by God, but He also orders their use, not their atrophy. Conversion to Christ must, if needs be, take place within the atmosphere of a debating society, where he who seeks to convert must put all his cards on the table. Otherwise, what will his victory be worth? To enter the Kingdom of Heaven as a child is not to enter it in leading-strings, or wearing blinkers (after the manner of some nuns), but to enter it fresh, vigorous, unspoiled, unprejudiced, and unhampered by petrified tradition.

I think Father Hebert would admit this in his heart of hearts, and it is certainly part of the tradition of Kelham as founded by Father Kelly. But it is most doubtful whether it is compatible with some types of institutional Christianity, and hence I have myself always feared an organic reunion of Churches which would leave most of the really vigorous and progressive Christians outside. It might be a perfectly united body, but it would also be a perfectly dead one.

And finally, is there not a fallacy in Father Hebert's insistence upon the Christian Revelation as though its content really was known once and for all, so that 'the older Catholic tradition' was a thing fixed? Surely this would land us logically in a flat-earth interpretation of the Ascension, and in a literal acceptance of special creation, and so on. The whole point about the present crisis in religion is that the new astronomy alone has lessened the appeal to authoritative tradition. The Church is not 'far down the ages now, her journey well-nigh done.' On the contrary, it may well be that we are only just beginning to learn to detect the difference between the passing and the permanent in the Christian Revelation. Anything therefore which fetters freedom and stifles enquiry is not only going to lower the worth of such conversions as may take place, but is also likely to cause those conversions to be made, not to a Living Spirit, but to formularies which will eventually be outgrown as theological expressions of timeless truth.

'LEAD US NOT INTO TEMPTATION'

By the Rev. G. F. Allen, M.A., Union Theological College, Canton, sometime Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford.

WE use the Lord's Prayer so constantly, and its influence as we use it is so great, that it is clearly urgent that we should understand what we mean by its words. One phrase in it, however, is difficult to understand, as may be seen from the great variety of attempts at interpretation.

In modern English the word 'tempt' bears the meaning entice or seduce. For most people the word bears this meaning when they pray 'Lead us not into temptation.' At once, however, there are difficulties. First, why should God be expected thus to lead us astray? St. James, who most clearly in the New Testament uses the word in this sense, says equally clearly, 'Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, and He Himself tempteth no man: but each man is tempted, when he is drawn away by his own lust and enticed' (*James* i, 13-14). Secondly, even if we pass this difficulty, it seems a cowardly prayer. We ought not to shrink from facing and rejecting wrong choice, for such rejection of evil plays an essential part in the growth of character. The usual answer is to interpret the prayer as meaning 'Lead us not into temptation greater than we can bear.' Thus Plummer in his *Commentary on St. Matthew* says, 'He prays that his heavenly Father will not allow him to be too often and too sorely tried'; and Rawlinson in his comment on the prayer in *St. Luke* says that it is 'to be interpreted generally of a situation which involved especially grave temptation to sin.' The prayer does not, however, say this; and the attempt thus to explain it may mean that there is a more radical misinterpretation in its meaning.

If we look at the original meaning of the word, we shall find that both in English and in Greek, and, as J. H. Korn has pointed out, in German (*cf.* J. H. Korn, *Peirasmos*, Stuttgard, 1937), it has passed through very much the same range of meanings in its history. There is first a neutral sense meaning simply to experience. Thus Milton writes, 'who shall tempt with

wandering feet the unbottomed infinite abyss,' and the related Greek phrase has this meaning, when *Hebrews* writes of those who '*had trial* of mockings and scourgings' (*Hebrews* xi, 36; *cf.* Trench, *Synonyms of the New Testament*, *ad. loc.*). The Greek verb has then the meaning try, preserved in the cognate English word attempt (*cf. Acts* ix, 26 and xvi, 7). This then passes over into the meaning to make trial of, or to test or prove. Possibly in the Bible, in the original purpose of the translators, far more often than we realise, the word tempt has this meaning. In the sixteenth century Archbishop Hamilton could write, 'Ye sal understand that in haly scripture, this word tempe is als mekil to say, as to tak experience or preif of any thing' (*Introduction to the Catechism*, 1552). The verb clearly bears this sense when St. Paul says, 'Try your own selves, whether ye be in the faith' (*II Cor.* xiii, 5), and when the Fourth Gospel comments on the question of Christ, 'This He said to prove him' (*John* vi, 6). Since Christ is the subject, the word cannot possibly in this last case mean seduce or entice. The word has later suffered the common fate of becoming debased in meaning. Since human nature all too often was found wanting when put to the proof, the word later came to suggest falling away into evil.

As Korn points out in his very clear treatise, the main use of the word in the Bible is the testing or trial of the faithful. The stock instance of such trial in Jewish tradition is the testing of the faith of the patriarch Abraham (*cf. Genesis* xxii, 1: *Ecclus.* xliv, 20; *Hebrews* xi, 17). In later Judaism two developments take place. Under Persian influence Satan appears, and in the prologue to *Job* he is assigned the rôle of counsel for the prosecution in testing the faith of Job. The association with Satan begins to give the word a more sinister meaning, though in keeping with Jewish monotheism Satan is not here an absolute power of evil in opposition to God, but a servant or angel of God in the courts of heaven. Later in the Apocalyptic literature the word comes to bear the technical sense of the testing of the faithful in the trials before the final end (*cf. Revelation* iii, 10). Dr. Schweitzer gives it this technical sense in the Lord's Prayer: 'He makes believers pray to God that God will not lead them into temptation, that is to say into the afflictions brought about by the powers of evil which will precede the Messianic kingdom'

(Schweitzer, *Mysticism of St. Paul*, p. 56). It is quite certain that in the New Testament the word sometimes bears this meaning of the trial of faith (*cf. e.g. I Corinthians* x, 13 and *Hebrews* ii, 18). In one case at least it approaches the modern debased sense of enticement, when *I Timothy* writes, 'They that desire to be rich fall into a temptation and a snare and many foolish and hurtful lusts' (*I Timothy* vi, 9).

Korn interprets the word in the Lord's Prayer as meaning the trial of faith, but if so, we are still left with the same difficulties. The trial of faith may be something we need for the strengthening of our faith, and it is still a cowardly prayer to seek to avoid it. The book of *Wisdom* sees the positive value of such trial, when it says: 'Having borne a little chastening, they shall receive great good; because God made trial of them, and found them worthy of Himself' (*Wisdom* iii, 5). One Psalm actually asks to receive such trial: 'Examine me, O Lord, and prove me; try my reins and my heart' (*Psalm* xxvi, 2). The epistle of *James* welcomes the trial of faith, in a way which would be the precise contradiction of the Lord's Prayer, if that were the meaning of the prayer. So far from praying for deliverance from temptation in this sense, he writes: 'Count it all joy, my brethren, when ye fall into manifold temptations; knowing that the proof of your faith worketh patience. . . . Blessed is the man that endureth temptation: for when he hath been approved, he shall receive the crown of life' (*James* i, 2, 3, 12).

There is, however, another tradition in the Old Testament background, which plays almost as large a part as the trial of the faithful in Jewish thought; and it is perhaps to this that we must look for the meaning of the Lord's Prayer. In the Septuagint *peirasmos* is constantly used as the translation of *massah*, which is translated temptation in the margin of our Bible. The word here still means testing or putting to the proof, but it is now used, not of man as being tested, but of man as testing God. The original case is found in *Exodus* xvii, where it is paraphrased in the saying, 'They tempted the Lord, saying, Is the Lord among us or not?' (*Exodus* xvii, 7). *Deuteronomy* then gives the warning law: 'Ye shall not tempt the Lord your God, as ye tempted Him in Massah' (*Deuteronomy* vi, 16). Tempting God is forbidden, because it springs from a latent distrust, and

this distrust is contrasted with the faith that obeys: 'Ye shall diligently keep the commandments of the Lord your God.' The same contrast is described in vivid form in *Psalm* cvi: 'They soon forgat His works; they waited not for His counsel: but lusted exceedingly in the wilderness, and tempted God in the desert. And He gave them their request but sent leanness into their soul' (*Psalm* cvi, 13-15; *cf.* also *Psalms* lxxviii, 17-18 and 56, and xcv, 8-9). The contrast of obedient faith with the testing mood of doubt is the opening theme of the book of *Wisdom*: 'Love righteousness, ye that be judges of the earth, think ye of the Lord with a good mind, and in singleness of heart seek ye Him; because He is found of them that tempt Him not, and is manifested to them that do not distrust Him' (*Wisdom* i, 1-2). The sin of Massah, like the faith of Abraham, survives as a typical incident in the New Testament period. *Hebrews* quotes *Psalm* xcv: 'Harden not your hearts, as in the provocation, as in the day of temptation in the wilderness: when your fathers tempted Me, proved Me, and saw My works forty years.' (*Hebrews* iii, 8-9). The verse is important since it shows that the noun can be used in New Testament Greek, in the way it is immediately paraphrased, in the active sense of tempting God. Finally, the quotation by our Lord of the Deuteronomic warning is a sign that He Himself had felt the danger of the sin of Massah.

Let us now look a little more closely at the meaning of the temptation of Jesus, for we may expect to find there, in His experience, the meaning of His prayer. There have been three main lines of interpretation. The first follows the modern conventional meaning of temptation as enticement to evil. Thus a recent writer in the popular notes of the Bible Reading Fellowship says, 'Our Lord's first temptation may be regarded as avoiding the hard and arduous way and having a little more comfort and security.' This line of interpretation makes the first temptation seem trite and the second pointless. If we grant the miraculous power, there could have been little real evil in satisfying His hunger, and no enticement at all to throw Himself down from the temple.

The more common modern line of interpretation is to relate the Temptation to the various possible tasks of the Messiah

which Jesus faced at the outset of His ministry. Thus Klausner writes: 'Obsessed by the idea that He was the Messiah, Jesus meditated on the three methods by which on the current view the Messiah would declare Himself.' The Bishop of Gloucester, in his *Life and Teaching of Jesus*, speaks of the temptation to bring in a Messianic kingdom of wealth and ease and material happiness. Leonard Hodgson, in *And was made Man*, speaks of the temptation to become the Messianic warrior prince, or, alternatively, to appear in the skies and be hailed by the faithful assembled in the temple. There is little doubt that Jesus did thus reject the picture of the Warrior Messiah, and also, as Otto has shown, profoundly modify the picture of the Son of Man Messiah by the bold, original step of identifying the Messiah with the Suffering Servant. There are, however, grave difficulties in this interpretation. It involves a somewhat far-fetched allegorizing of the actual details of the scene. More seriously, if the temptation to turn stones into bread meant using His powers to satisfy the physical needs of men, then in fact on the Gospel story Jesus precisely later fell into this temptation in the feeding of the multitudes. Finally, this line of interpretation misses the point that all the quotations are from the book of *Deuteronomy*. Whatever may have been His thought at other times, at this point the mind of Jesus does not seem to have been moving in the later world of apocalyptic expectation, but rather to have been reflecting on the earlier Jewish law.

The Temptation ends in *Luke* with the quotation from *Deuteronomy*, 'Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.' Taking this clue, we may interpret it against the background of the Massah tradition. This third line of interpretation, though less common, gives a far more vivid meaning to the scene. W. C. Allen in his commentary on *Matthew* takes the first temptation to mean the putting to test of His own consciousness of divine Sonship, the second the putting of God to the test. In a little book, *The Lord of all Good Life*, which though less scholarly is full of wise insights, Donald Hankey wrote of the first temptation, 'To begin with was He sure in His own mind that He was the Son of God?': of the second in *Luke* he wrote, 'But even granting that He was right not to demand a sign for Himself, ought He not to ask one for the sake of the people?' Here the

central point is the lurking doubt implied in the tempter's 'if.' It is sometimes objected that the 'if' with the indicative must mean, 'Seeing that you are the Son of God, how will you fulfil the Messianic rôle?' It is however quite clear elsewhere that the 'if' with the indicative can have a hypothetical meaning. Precisely the same Greek phrase is used by the mockers under the Cross; and it cannot for them express the belief that He is without doubt the Christ (*Matthew* xxvii, 40; *cf. Luke* xxiii, 37).

If we take the 'if' as implying doubt, at once we get a clear and vivid meaning. At the Baptism there has come the conviction of the Messianic call. Being also human, Jesus shrinks into hesitancy before so tremendous a claim. How can He prove for certain that God has in fact called? In keeping with later Jewish tradition, the devil appears on the scene as the Tester. The devil as testing Jesus is a projection of His own inner testing of His Messianic call. God would not suffer His Messiah to hunger; let Him test the truth of God's call by seeing if He will grant miraculous power to relieve His hunger. The suggestion is rejected with a phrase which comes from the passage in *Deuteronomy* of which the whole scene is reminiscent, and which gives that sense of trusting obedience with which Massah is everywhere contrasted: 'Man doth not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.' But then, as Donald Hankey suggests, will not the multitudes need a spectacular sign, if they are to accept Him as Messiah? For them, as for Himself, the testing mood that seeks a sign is rebellion against God, and can never take the place of obedient trust. 'Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.'

In *Luke* the account ends with the words, 'When the devil had ended all the temptation, he departed from Him for a season': and later Jesus speaks to His disciples of other occasions of temptation (*Luke* iv, 13 and xxii, 28). Korn acutely sees in these verses a reference to the numerous occasions when the critics and enemies of Jesus came to Him, tempting Him. Korn however seems to miss the full point when he interprets these incidents in the Abraham tradition of the trial of faith, and not in the Massah tradition of the putting of God to the proof. *Mark* writes: 'The Pharisees came forth, and began to question with Him, seeking of Him a sign from heaven, tempting Him. And

He sighed deeply in spirit, and saith, Why doth this generation seek after a sign?' (*Mark* viii, 11, 12). The parallel tradition in Q adds the saying, 'An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; but there shall no sign be given to it but the sign of Jonah the prophet' (*Matthew* xii, 39). As Jesus had foreseen in His own temptation, the people in their turn ask for a sign and proof of His call. We are reminded that in the Massah tradition the doubting mood that asks for a sign is set in contrast with the trustful obedience of faith. We are reminded that in the Prophets adultery stands for disobedience and the break of faith with God. Jesus sighs deeply in spirit, because He feels in those around Him the doubt that cannot trust. He rebukes so firmly those who ask for a sign because He is rebuking in them precisely that same separation from God in doubt, which He had rejected once for all in His own mind, when He said, 'Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.'

Now in this setting we can see the full force of the prayer, 'Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil one.' Lead us not into Massah. Lead us not into this testing mood of doubt. Lead us not into this leanness of soul, which has lost its childlike sense of God's presence, and asks vainly, 'Is the Lord among us or not?' Perhaps we have lost the full force of this prayer because we have lost that first prior sense of the hearing of God's will and the presence of His kingdom, with which it is in contrast. Perhaps we should rather pray to-day, 'Lead us out of Massah, for we are dwelling in Massah.' With our modern scientific outlook we have become so used to doubting and testing everything that as a matter of course we expect to test all things, God included, and ask Him to show His presence by proof and sign. Especially in such days as these men ask, Where is God? Why does He not stop this war? Why does He not show His presence by a sign, that all may believe? All else we are right to test and prove, but there was a meaning in that Deuteronomic warning, Thou shalt not tempt God. Along that path we shall never discover the certainty of God's presence. The call of God is there if we would hear it, speaking in truth and righteousness in our conscience. Once we have put the fatal moment of doubt and hesitancy between the hearing and the obeying of His call, we shall never recover the sense of

His presence by asking for a sign; the only path back is the return to childlike trust and obedience. Now we see that it is no cowardly prayer to say 'Lead us not into Massah, but deliver us from the evil one.' We see that this prayer is just the negative counterpart of the earlier positive prayer of faith and obedience, 'Thy will be done, Thy kingdom come.'

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS

By G. L. H. Harvey, M.A.,
Editor of *The Church in the Twentieth Century.*

LORD Halifax has recently told America that the present war is 'a mortal clash of two philosophies.' Professor Santayana saw the war of 1914-18 in the same light. He was so convinced of the justice of his interpretation that in 1916 he published a book in which he systematically analysed the relationship between German philosophy and German political action. He did not hold the German philosophers responsible for the war nor for the 'corporate fanaticism' which had prepared for it. He had, however, not the slightest doubt that they had 'shared and justified prophetically that spirit of uncompromising self-assertion and metaphysical conceit which the German nation is now reducing to action.'

In 1939, immediately before the outbreak of the present war, he considered that contemporary conditions justified the republication of his book with the addition of a Postscript on *The Nature of Egotism and of the Moral Conflicts that Disturb the World.*[1] He writes from the standpoint of a genial humanist, docile to the facts of experience. He is very critical of romanticism, which he treats as at the same time an error and a disease. The romanticist is a man who, impatient of the world as it is, constructs new worlds which will conform to self-generated images and emotions. In the sphere of philosophy, the subjective idealist who spins a philosophic system from his inner consciousness falls under the same condemnation as the romanticist. His philosophy reaches its apotheosis when, with Hegel, he identi-

[1] *Egotism in German Philosophy.* (Published by J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1939. Price 7*s.* 6*d.*)

fies his egotism with the Absolute, and treats as blasphemy the notion that the world wags its own way apart from the viewing mind. Professor Santayana would have us discard the word 'absolute' as the most false and most odious of words. He himself holds that 'nature is not a product of the mind,' but that, on the contrary, 'there is an external world, ages prior to any idea of it, which the mind recognizes and feeds on.' He heartily agrees with the great humanist Montaigne that

> 'He who sets before him, as in a picture, this vast image of our mother Nature in her entire majesty; who reads in her aspect such universal and continual variety; who discerns himself therein, and not himself only but a whole kingdom, to be a most delicate dot—he alone esteems things according to the just measure of their greatness.'

Professor Santayana distinguishes between Egoism and Egotism. Egoism is neither more nor less than the self-assertion proper to every living creature. In excess or in defect it may become a vice. Egotism is *always* a vice. It arises from an excessive interest in ourselves and in our own thoughts and actions rather than in the objects of thought and activity. It can breed a diabolical courage, a satanic loftiness. It is 'subjectivism become proud of itself and proclaiming itself absolute.'

Though Kant himself was no egotist, his philosophy contains the germs of egotism. The new German religion is a religion of egotism, and, little though Kant might have relished the fact, he was in truth its prophet and founder. He was all this, since he laid it down that only an idea in the mind can be an object of knowledge. This is the principle which underlies pure subjectivism. Then, again looking inwards, Kant perceived what he called the categorical imperative, the absolute demand of an inner oracle, claiming unconditional obedience. It is true that, building on this foundation, he erected his postulates of God, free-will, and immortality, and urged us to act on these postulates as if they were realities, calling this act of will faith; but others who lacked his conservative instincts did not feel the necessity of following him along this line.

> 'He taught rather less than he secretly believed, and his disciples, seizing the principle of his scepticism, but lacking his conservative instincts, believed rather less than he taught them.'

Besides, the categorical principle can easily migrate and be directed in other directions than Kant would approve. Kant

himself never accepted the 'amazing principle of dogmatic egotism that nothing is able to exist unless I am able to know it.' He lacked the romantic pride and self-sufficiency of his philosophic descendants.

> 'A wizened little old bachelor, a sedentary provincial scribe, scrupulous and punctual, a courteous moralist who would have us treat humanity in the person of another as an end and never merely as a means, a pacifist and humanitarian who so revered the moral sense according to Shaftesbury and Adam Smith that, after having abolished earth and heaven, he was entirely comforted by the sublime truth that nevertheless it remained wrong to tell a lie—such a figure has nothing in it of the officious egotist or the superman. Yet his very love of exactitude and his scruples about knowledge, misled by the psychological fallacy that nothing can be an object of knowledge except some idea in the mind, led him in the end to subjectivism; while his rigid conscience, left standing in that unnatural void, led him to attribute absoluteness to what he calls the categorical imperative. But this void outside and this absolute oracle within are germs of egotism, and germs of the most virulent species.'

In Fichte's development of Kantianism, which deprived the thought of Kant of its more humane elements, the categorical imperative certainly migrated, and in a direction which would hardly have met with Kant's approval. The power behind it was not Will in the abstract, but the Will of the German people, which Fichte regarded as absolute and therefore identical with the Will of God. Professor Santayana thus summarizes Fichte's position:

> 'If the Germans suffered their national will to be domesticated in the Napoleonic empire, the creative spirit of the universe would be extinguished, and God Himself, who existed only when incarnate in mankind, would disappear.'

If this reading of Fichte's doctrine is just, the recent Nazi claim that 'God stands or falls with the German army' has a long and philosophically reputable ancestry.

Fichte had none of Kant's scruples about telling lies. The categorical imperative demanded the self-realization of the German people. Its demands were absolute. It did not matter whether loyalty to it involved lying and chicanery. Fichte made no bones about it.

> 'That a State, even on the very point of making war,' he wrote, 'should solemnly assert its love of peace and its aversion to conquest is nothing; for in the first place it must needs make this asseveration and so hide its real intention if it would succeed in its design; and the well-known principle *Threaten war that thou mayest have peace* may

> also be inverted in this way: *Promise peace that thou mayest begin war with advantage*; and in the second place the State may be wholly in earnest in its peaceful assurances, so far as its self-knowledge has gone; but let the favourable opportunity for aggrandizement present itself, and the previous good resolution is forgotten.'

Thus, nearly a century and a half ago, Fichte, the disciple of the truthful Kant, prophetically justified Hitler's 'fibs.' It would have been well if the statesmen and diplomats who negotiated with the Führer before the outbreak of the war had made a prior study of Fichte's philosophy. It would now seem that the categorical imperative has so far migrated that it is expressed in the Führer's will.

When he comes to Hegel, Professor Santayana does not hesitate to write him down as a philosophic egotist, in spite of the fact that in his later writings Hegel pours scorn on everything that is purely subjective. His reading of history, plausible though it may seem, moves him to laughter. 'He is creating a world in his head which might be admirable, if God had made it.' His Ego expresses itself in 'a nebula of words.' He seeks to force things to conform to words, not words to conform to things. Hence his self-engendered tenet that everything involves its opposite.

With Schopenhauer 'the pocket universe of Hegel opened out to the stars' and took on a tragic hue. At any rate Schopenhauer was unable to confine himself to the neat picture of 'a dramatic progress in history, with its beginning in Eden and its end in Berlin.' Nor was the so-called Will which he placed behind all things his own will evolving experience out of nothing. He looked on life, and behold, 'The ground of life, the will in all things, was something lurid and tempestuous.'

Schopenhauer possessed too keen a sense of the tragedy of life to justify that tragedy on the ground that it provided a fine and beautiful spectacle for the delectation of the philosophic observer. Not so Nietzsche. He rejoiced in the conception of a categorical imperative which was neither more nor less than a brutal Will to Power. He, like Schopenhauer, was a romanticist, though a romanticist of a different type.

> 'Romantic poets and their heroes are well known to oscillate between passionate despair and passionate enterprise. Schopenhauer affected passionate despair, Nietzsche recommended passionate enter-

prise, each being wedded exclusively to one of those moods which Faust or Byron could feel alternately and reduce to act with all the dashing tumult of anarchy.'

If modern German statecraft can find its justification in Fichte, the brutal romanticism of Nazi youth, driven on by a categorical imperative which demands the boundless aggrandizement of the Fatherland, may properly claim its derivation from Nietzsche, unpleasant though Nietzsche would have found the modern young German. Professor Santayana thinks that this subjective romanticism is a definite disease. He believes that man is 'a teachable animal living in a natural world,' and that man should strive to learn from the world in which he is placed instead of evolving subjective worlds from his own mind and emotions. It is true that all nations are conceited, but usually a consideration of conditions and circumstances and the impact of reality restrain national self-esteem and limit national ambition to what is possible.

He sees a historic and philosophic significance in the German aptitude for music, the most subjective of the arts. Music is 'a means of giving form to our inner feelings without attaching them to events or objects in the world.' Its language 'avoids, or at least veils, the articulation of the world we live in.' Music is 'the chosen art of a mind to whom the world is still foreign.'

'But let these inspired musicians, masters in their own infinite realms, beware of the touch of nature. Let them not compose a system of the universe out of their *Gemüth*, as they might a symphony. Let them not raise their baton in the face of the stars or of the nations and think to lead them like an orchestra.'

BOOK REVIEWS

THE BEGINNINGS OF GNOSTIC CHRISTIANITY*

Mr. L. Gordon Rylands has written a most intriguing and ingenious book on Christian Origins. *The Beginnings of Gnostic Christianity* certainly forces us to view the early history and documents of Christianity in a new light, though some may think that light is only artificial. Mr. Rylands has no love for historic Christianity or for normal religion, which he perhaps misunderstands and underrates. He quotes P. H. D. d'Holbach with but slightly qualified approval:

> 'Nature tells man to seek light, to search for the truth; religion enjoins upon him to examine nothing, to remain in ignorance. Nature says to man: "Cherish glory, labour to win esteem, be active, courageous, industrious"; religious says to him: "Be humble, abject, pusillanimous, live in retreat, busy thyself in prayer, meditation, devout rites"—and goes on, "The early Gnosticism had some obvious defects; but it was not by intrinsic merit that Catholic Christianity prevailed. Its victory may have been a survival of the fit in relation to the environment; but it was not a survival of the best" (p. 276).

The following quotation shows Mr. Rylands' own hope and ideal:

> 'If it were possible to get back to the earliest years of the first century, what would be recovered would be a Gnostic Christianity which adored a heavenly Christ, but had no knowledge of a human Jesus. Christians might perhaps do worse than return to a modernized form of it' (p. 274).

He is a follower of W. B. Smith, Loisy, Guignebert, Bousset and Van Manen.

At the outset it should be said first that the book makes certain assumptions about the historicity of the Gospel narratives and the nature of the Pauline Epistles which are essential to the argument but are not adequately treated within its pages. The author's other books, *Did Jesus Ever Live?* and *A Critical Analysis of the Four Chief Pauline Epistles* are the background. Secondly, Mr. Rylands uses both 'Gnosticism' and 'Christianity' in unusual senses, as indeed he says in the Preface:

> 'By Gnostic Christianity I mean the Christianity of Paul and of the Fourth Gospel as distinguished from the doctrines of such writers as Basilides and Valentinus, which I term Christian Gnosticism.'

We find later on that Mark's Gospel was very largely 'Gnostic,' so that Gnosticism comes to include all that is normally meant by early Christianity, suitably refined, and since Christianity is used of those who 'revered a divine Christ,' it has no essential connexion with historic Christianity

* *The Beginnings of Gnostic Christianity*. By L. Gordon Rylands, B.A., B.Sc. (Lond.). (C. A. Watts & Co. Ltd. Price 15/-. Publication date: May 23rd, 1940.)

and there could be 'Christians' before the first Christmas A.D., or C.E. as Mr. Rylands prefers to call it. Thus the Sampsaeans were

> 'a Jewish sect, and they were Christians in the sense that they revered a divine Christ. Certainly, however, their Christ had no connexion with Jesus. The same may be predicted of the early Gnostic Ebionites; but . . . they, or some of them, did at some time begin to regard Jesus as a manifestation of the Christ' (p. 146).

On the authority of Epiphanius the Ossaeans and Nasaraeans are listed as pre-Christian Christians (p. 143).

The Introductory Chapter deals with the influence of Hellenism on Judaism, with the Wisdom Literature and with Hellenistic-Jewish Sects. In this chapter the leading ideas of the whole book are adumbrated. Thus of *Ecclus.* xxiv, 3-5, we are told:

> 'Two expressions in these verses are of particular importance. The statement that Wisdom "came forth from the mouth of the Most High" foreshadows the assimilation of Wisdom to the Word which afterwards came about. In fact, the writer must already have been thinking of the Word of God as the expression of his Wisdom. And the statement that Wisdom "covered the earth as a mist" may have contributed by comparison with the statement in Genesis that "the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters" to the subsequent identification of Wisdom with the Holy Spirit. The result of this readjustment of conceptions was that eventually the qualities and operations of Wisdom were transferred to the Logos, while Wisdom remained the Holy Spirit' (pp. 8-9, *cf.* Wisdom ix, 17, p. 11).

In the *Wisdom of Solomon*

> 'We can trace the influence of Greek speculative ideas with regard to man and the cosmos, such as the Platonic doctrines of the human soul and the divine Reason (Logos) and the Stoic doctrine of a world-soul, which certainly are not simply borrowed, but combined and transformed under the action of the Jewish preconceptions of the writer. Thus we may account for the appearance of the belief in an immortal spirit in man which is related to the Spirit of God. And the spirit of God is identified with Wisdom. There is evidence that the writer was acquainted with Plato's description of the Just Man persecuted and slain by the unrighteous. Wisdom, although pure spirit, is still very definitely personified and accessible' (quoting *Wisd.* vi, 12-19) (pp. 10-11).

Wisdom xviii, 14-16, is quoted to show how the Word came to be equally personified when Wisdom and Word were differentiated. Finally:

> 'Hellenistic Jews substituted for Israel the congregation of the saints, and for the Judaic Messiah, as the bringer of truth and light, the Logos. Ultimately, however, in Catholic Christianity the Logos was merged into the Messiah' (p. 15).

Various such congregations or sects would arise — Essenes, Therapeuts, Naasenes, Peratai, etc.— and

> 'some pre-Christian Gnostics, probably Cainites, are attacked in the *Book of Enoch*. Philo knows nothing of Christians as such; no doubt

because in his time there was no organised Christian Church. There were scattered communities from the union of which the Christian Church was ultimately constituted. As it is written in the preface to Guignebert's book: "In these sects [Gnostic], these exclusive circles which believed themselves to be the depositories of absolute Truth and of Salvation, we may find the true explanation of Christianity' (p. 20).

It is argued that such sects or Gnostic communities had mystery-cults based on the fusion of Jewish and Pagan mysteries, the evidence for which is drawn from pictures and tombs in Jewish and Christian catacombs at Rome and from the Syncretism of Orphism and Judaism at Alexandria (p. 21). It would have been well to have cited and described such interesting evidence in much greater detail.

The next two chapters examine the character, date and doctrine of the *Odes of Solomon,* which the author maintains was a Psalm Book of one such Gnostic Sect who 'were religious reformers and mystics who, though anti-Judaic, had not ceased to consider themselves Jews' (p. 22). This book Mr. Rylands maintains was pre-Christian, probably composed over a period during and towards the end of the last pre-Christian century, and was based upon the Wisdom Literature and the Prophets, especially *Isaiah,* of the doctrines of which it is a development. This he endeavours to substantiate by a detailed examination in parallel columns of passages from the Odes and from their alleged sources. His case, even if some passages which he ejects as Christian interpolations are omitted, does not seem absolutely convincing, although most interesting; but a final decision on such a difficult question could only be reached after careful examination of the passages and the whole book in their original language.

Of the doctrine Mr. Rylands says:

'The doctrine of the *Odes of Solomon* is essentially simple, consisting of a few grand ideas all of which are implicitly contained in the *Wisdom of Solomon* . . . The expression "knowledge of God" is to be found in *Isaiah.* In the Wisdom literature this "knowledge" with a somewhat expanded significance is personified as "Wisdom." As we read in *Prov.* ii, 6, "The Lord giveth wisdom; out of His mouth cometh knowledge and understanding." In the *Wisdom of Solomon,* though wisdom as an abstract quality still includes knowledge as well as understanding, a separation is made by regarding the personified Wisdom as the bringer of knowledge. An advance upon this conception could not fail to come about, because practically it meant that Wisdom brought herself. And since it had been said that wisdom, knowledge, and understanding had come "out of the mouth" of the Lord, the next step naturally was to imagine that they had been brought to men through the word of God. The expression "the word of God" would be familiar to the Odist from the *Psalms*; and in one passage in the *Wisdom of Solomon* the Word is personified. The Logos had also been personified in the Helleno-Egyptian theosophy, of which it is probable that the Odist had some knowledge. Hence the

> Word replaced Wisdom, both as the personification of an abstraction and yet also, like Wisdom, as a divine Spirit and the bringer of divine knowledge. The Word, then, as the utterance of God, was conceived as a part of Himself, and at the same time as having objective existence. But, since the utterance of God is not physically audible, just as Wisdom was supposed to become known through entering as a spiritual emanation from God into the souls of men, so does the Word bring the knowledge of God by inward spiritual penetration. And notwithstanding the personification, He is no more a "person" than Wisdom is a person . . . To imagine that when he [the Odist] wrote of the Word he was thinking of some historical person or that when he gave to the Word the Jewish appellation "the Christ" he was referring to Christ Jesus, of whom he had certainly never heard, is a most hopeless aberration of criticism' (pp. 115-7).

Chapter IV is entitled 'The Dogma of the Incarnation,' and deals with this in relation to Jewish Gnostic Communities in the First Century, the Naasenes, Peratai and Sethians, and the Clementines. As a result of this examination the evolution of the dogma of the Incarnation is described thus:

> 'It had its root in the teaching of the Wisdom of Solomon that Wisdom, a spiritual emanation from God, passes into holy souls. Then for Wisdom was substituted the Word, like Wisdom personified, and named the Christ and Son of God, but really believed to be a formless Spirit, taking the shape of those in whom He becomes incarnate. Gradually the personification was more definitely and more literally conceived. Certain men were thought to have been exceptional manifestations of the Christ. Then by some Adam alone was thought to have been, or to have embodied, the Christ and to have appeared upon earth on several occasions . . . Finally Jesus was substituted for Adam as the vehicle' (p. 144).

'The Name *Jesus*' is the title of the next chapter. It is argued that 'the prophet' of *Deut.* xviii, 15, who was to come after Moses, was historically Joshua, that Joshua was later expected to reappear upon the earth, and that the names 'Jesus' and 'Joshua,' the same in Greek, became confused, so that the expected Prophet and Messiah came to be Jesus. A passage of Origen's Commentary on John is cited as strong evidence (pp. 151-2). No reference is given, but it seems that the phrase, '*We* have *also* to hear *our Lord* Jesus speaking to the children of Israel' (the significant words are in italics) introduced by Origen exactly at the point where he ceases to talk about Joshua and begins to talk about Jesus, is adversative and sufficient to show that Origen, in spite of his allegorising and mystical exegesis, knew perfectly well that he was talking about two persons and that the second is much more significant to him, for he calls him 'Lord.' How then is 'the identification of Jesus with Joshua absolute'? In any case, in view of all the glory which is attached to Moses among the Jews, especially among Hellenistic Jews like Philo, can we believe that Joshua could be anything but an anti-climax as the expected

Messiah? Surely only a few eccentrics could have elevated him to the Messianic rank, and he would surely be a politico-military, not a Gnostic-mystic Messiah. In addition the evidence given on pages 159-161 that 'Jesus' was a divine name before the Christian era seems hardly convincing. The conclusion given is:

> 'Of all the names which were applied by any Gnostics to the Christ, Jesus (Jeshua or Jeshu) was the most likely to secure general adoption, because the name signifies a Saviour. We find in Matthew evidence that the name was chosen for that very reason. The angel says to Joseph, "Thou shalt call his name Jesus, for it is he that shall save his people from their sins." The function assigned is that of a divine being and not within the competence of any man . . . Epiphanius gives information concerning a sect of Nasaraeans which, he says, existed long before Christ . . . Nazarene and Nazaraean may be merely different Greek renderings of the Aramaic or Syriac. W. B. Smith pointed out that there is a Hebrew root nātsar, which means to guard or to preserve from evil. The participial substantive formed from this root is notser, which would mean a preserver or saviour, and is consequently synonymous with Jesus. Nazarene, of which the Hebrew equivalent is notsri, would be formed from the same root by the addition of a Greek adjectival suffix; and thus we get for the meaning of Jesus Nazarene "the saviour who preserves." Nazaraean would then quite naturally be the designation of a sect which revered a Saviour. By Greek-speaking people . . . Jesus would readily be connected in thought with 'Jesis' (healing) and with Jaso (genetive Jasous), the goddess of health and healing. . . . It is known that the Greek name Jason was considered by Jews to be equivalent to Jeshua or Jeshu; and we know from Strabo and Justin that the cult of Jason was widely spread not only in Asia Minor but also in the West, He too was a healer and saviour. Jesus, as the common name for the Christ, then became the chief bond of union among men whose doctrines differed so much as . . . Mark and John . . . Paul, James and Barnabas' (pp. 161-2).

The possibility of W. B. Smith's derivation and interpretation is of course disputed by others.

But 'the most striking difference between the Pauline and the primitive Gnosticism is the special emphasis laid in the former upon the death of the Christ,' and therefore the next chapter considers the origin of that conception. The author remarks that 'Theologians necessarily come to this examination with a bias' (p. 164), though on the subject of the Trial they have shown more candour. Mr. Rylands finds the whole so riddled with difficulties and contradictions that he despairs — somewhat gladly! — of all historicity and finds the dogma explained by such hypotheses as that 'the persecution and martyrdom to which the congregation or its members were exposed could be symbolically described as the persecution and martyrdom of the Christ' (p. 188) (we have to remember that Mr. Rylands believes that for this type of thinking 'there is an invisible spiritual Christ the Son and a material one, the latter being the community; and

the two are united as spirit and body are united' (p. 82)), or that 'the shameful death of the Just' in *Wisdom* II was literalised as follows:

> 'Really . . . the "shameful death" of *Wisdom* is hardly likely to have meant crucifixion in the Roman sense. The passage was doubtless suggested by Plato's picture of the sufferings of the ideally righteous man, in which he is said to have been 'impaled' . . . There is reason to believe that the Odist was acquainted with the writings of Plato. Some knowledge of Platonic doctrine seems to be indicated in Ode xxxiv:
>
> > "The likeness of that which is below is that which is above; for everything is above; and below there is nothing, but it is believed to be by those who have not knowledge."
>
> 'Obviously people who held opinions of that kind were not bound to historical reality and might be capable of thinking and writing of a symbolic death as if it were more real than a physical one. And, since the argument of Plato was that the ideal Just Man must necessarily have been ill-treated and slain, when the belief was established among Gnostic Christians that the Logos had "appeared," belief in His ignominious and yet glorious death necessarily followed. Moreover, Plato's ideal man must have been actually the Platonic "idea" of man; not a mere abstraction, but the supernal perfect being of whom the human race was supposed to be a very imperfect copy, for the reason that the supernal ideal man is marred through being impressed upon matter. The Gnostic conception of the incarnate Logos was so closely analogous to this that it would be strange indeed if they had not identified him with Plato's Just Man' (p. 189).

The remaining chapters endeavour to support the conclusions reached, by an examination and expurgation of the Pauline and Johannine Literature and of *Mark*, which is found to be symbolic and Gnostic in character, later than and based on an uninterpolated Gospel of Peter. There are appendices on the original nuclei of the Gospel of Peter, *Romans*, I and II *Corinthians*, *Galatians*, and the Johannine Prologue which is made to include *John* iii, 16-21.

Mr. Rylands' thesis needs careful examination in detail before final judgment on its truth as a whole could be passed, but it would seem that something like a *via media* between his non-historical theory and crudely or merely historical views which he calls materialist and literalist would most likely be nearest the truth. It may be thought that Mr. Rylands has an inadequate idea of history, for he can apparently find no place in the historical process for the unique or even for the really new 'emergent.' Thus he says:

> 'All historical examples of the execution of fanatical idealists make it certain that Jesus would have spurned the false accusation and proclaimed the ideas for which he was ready to suffer' (p. 165), and 'Of no great religion has the central point ever been an historical event' (p. 177).

Arguments from such empirical generalisations to future impossibility or impossibility in all circumstances are surely invalid, and philosophy and

science find no difficulty in allowing for the emergence of the new or even the unique. Moreover, however noble the 'Gnostic' religion and ideal may be, it remains true that in a world where evil is so manifest and powerful, an actual historical revelation of the goodness of God and of its power to triumph over evil even through suffering and death, or by the redemptive power of *vicarious* (not 'expiatory,' which Mr. Rylands dislikes) suffering, must be of supreme value and importance. Plato would have welcomed it, and Philo too. Was not such a historical manifestation given at the Exodus in another way? God's power over physical and moral death needed manifestation just as much as His power over or in historical events. The value of the Platonic types and of Plato's prophetic insight into the nature of things is that they have never allowed the historical process to become merely historical or fact and value, matter and spirit, to be completely divorced. Plato, Philo, the Neo-Platonists and the Christian Platonists, in spite of all their myth, symbol, allegory and exegesis, never lost sight of that, but the error of some Gnostics was that they did. They lost sight of the coasts of history, abandoned the guiding stars of philosophy, and wandered over an ocean of fancy. Perhaps we should be wise to cull the fruits of Mr. Rylands' erudition and use it to interpret our history and the working of God therein.

With regard to Mr. Rylands' method, since he shows little respect for Theologians and their intellectual impartiality, it is only fair to point out that it is hardly 'scientific' to assume that the sources one prefers, such as Epiphanius, cannot err, be partial, fanciful or deliberately deceptive while the documents one attacks are full of these shortcomings. In any case absolute consistency can hardly be expected in any such ancient works —can it in any modern?—and in these latter days we see only too well how false or partially false and confused reports are spread abroad and accepted as fact in a very short time, even though there is a basis of fact which gave rise to them. In particular the evidence of Tacitus and Suetonius is ignored (p. 148), though the author may have thought them interpolated, and one can hardly have such a high opinion of the administrators of Roman Justice as he seems to have (p. 166f.) after reading Cicero's Verrines and other orations, the record of the actions of the noble Brutus as a provincial governor in Cicero's Letters, and Philo's stories about Flaccus and Gaius.

But whatever counter-criticisms Mr. Rylands' criticisms may evoke, his book is thought-provoking and full of valuable material and suggestions. Especially interesting are some of the pieces of out-of-the-way information about odd sects and doctrines and the parallels in diverse sources it brings up, as for instance Sophia-marriages and Philo (pp. 86-7), Logophanies (pp. 132, 136-7), and Gospel-healings demonstrating the overthrow of polytheism (pp. 246-51). It would have been better if authorities in

references and allusions had always been cited by chapter and verse instead of vaguely or by mere quotations, as for instance Philo on pp. 95 and 235 or Origen in a crucial passage for Mr. Rylands' thesis on p. 151.

W. Richardson.

CULTURAL CONTACTS OF RELIGION *

Religion and science are the warp and woof of civilization, and in this book their relations are traced from ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt to the present day. Sir Richard Gregory, who was Editor of the leading scientific journal in this country, *Nature*, for forty-five years, is well qualified to write on this subject.

Because science signifies new knowledge, it must necessarily be a disturbing factor in social life and require adjustments of thought and action to it, with a resultant clash between it and traditional beliefs and practices, so that mutual misunderstandings have arisen.

> 'The mistake has been, and is, to make the conflict one between Christianity and science, instead of between obscurantism and enlightenment . . . (Religion and science) are parts of an evolutionary process of human development; and once it is realized that each has to adjust itself to changing conditions created by expanding thought, the causes of hostility disappear.'

Sir Richard defines religion as 'the reaction to an inner impulse as to what is conceived to be sacred and arouses awe or reverence,' and science as 'the accumulation of knowledge of the properties of natural objects — animate and inanimate — in relation to man's needs, and his understanding of them through the use of his intelligence.' One represents the emotional side of man's nature, while the other (no less the product of an inner urge) is the construction of a mental picture which gives acceptable form to what is known at any stage of inquiry. Thus both religion and science are expressions each of a characteristic side of human nature; these two sides are complementary to and not contradictory of one another. Only when the development of the one side or of the other is artificially restricted, does trouble arise. The exponents of religion attempt to fit all new knowledge into a system of thought having no claims to scientific accuracy. Such well-intentioned efforts are harmful to religion.

> 'It is only by disregarding history that the idea of a fixed and final theology becomes possible. In science, there are no final interpretations or unchangeable hypotheses; and if the same principle were recognized in theology, religion would share some of the vitality of the natural sciences.'

It is too commonly assumed that devotion to science inhibits all emotional sensitiveness and all understanding of emotional expression such as religion or art can supply. Some unfortunate remarks of Charles

* *Religion in Science and Civilization*, by Sir Richard Gregory, F.R.S. (Macmillan & Co. 12/6. 1940.)

Darwin and J. S. Mill have given excuses for holding this erroneous belief. Sir Richard Gregory in a chapter, 'Science and the Humanities,' takes a different view:

> 'The highest gifts in poetry are closely akin to those required for the highest achievements in science. Some of the greatest poets have been masters of the science of their time. Wordsworth looked forward to the time when modern science, having entered into the equipment of all cultured men, would inspire a new order of poetry, as mediaeval science inspired Dante. The two orders of mental effort depend upon the imagination; the man of science uses his imagination to weave events into laws and relations; the poet sees them in relation to the human soul.'

Sir Richard makes some reference to the Report of the Archbishops' Commission on Doctrine, observing that though it 'cannot be regarded as adequate from the point of view either of science or philosophy,' it yet does include pronouncements 'for which the authors would, at earlier periods of the earth's history, have been burned at the stake,' and is therefore 'a landmark in the history of Christian doctrine.' He concludes that the attitude displayed is 'more than one of toleration only.'

> 'It implies recognition of the fact that, just as in scientific investigations, hypothesis is subject to modification in the light of increased knowledge, so in matters of theological doctrine, orthodoxy is not static, but must vary in connotation with increase of understanding and a clearer view of the cosmic process. Further, that such understanding may bring about change in forms of belief, without affecting faith in the central doctrine of Christianity.'

Sir Richard Gregory deals with a variety of interesting topics, but that which will interest the reader most at the present time is the one which the author confesses lies nearest his heart, *i.e.* that of the social and ethical bearings of science, involving the question of the uses to which scientific knowledge is to be put.

> 'The view that the sole function of science is the discovery and study of natural facts and principles without regard to the social implications of the knowledge gained, cannot rightly be maintained. It is being widely recognized that science cannot be divorced from ethics or rightly absolve itself from the human responsibilities in the application of its discoveries to destructive purposes in war or economic disturbances in time of peace. Men of science cannot rightly stand aside from the social and political questions involved in the structure which has been built up from the materials provided by them, and which their discoveries may be used to destroy. It is their duty to assist in the establishment of a rational and harmonious social order out of the welter of human conflict into which the world has been thrown through the release of uncontrolled sources of industrial production and of lethal weapons.'

This book is a sound exposition of the scientific humanism of which the world stands in such need. J.C.H.

SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THEOLOGICAL COLLEGES*

In December, 1935, the Council of Ridley Hall invited Dr. Bullock to write a History of the Hall that might be ready for their Diamond Jubilee celebrations, planned, with an eye more to general convenience than to strict mathematical accuracy, for June, 1940. The present volume is the outcome of that invitation, and surveys the history of the Hall during the period of the first two Principals, Moule and Drury. There is also an interesting Introduction on theological education, and on the work of some of the more outstanding Evangelical leaders in Cambridge from 1775 to 1875; and some of the earlier chapters deal with the general background against which the proposal to found the Hall developed, and include an account of the important part played in the foundation by the Rev. E. H. Carr. It is hoped that, at some later date, a concluding volume may be produced: for the present, a brief *resumé* of events since 1907 is given in a short Postscript. Footnotes are plentiful without being obtrusive, and there is a useful Index and Bibliography. While we may agree with Dr. Bullock that the volume is 'somewhat ponderous,' we may feel that his object of a 'reasonable degree of completeness' has been in large measure attained.

The education and training of the clergy is a matter in which both clergy and laity have need, and reason, to be interested; and with the present system neither clergy nor laity can feel completely satisfied. Those of us for whom theological colleges and the General Ordination Examination are as natural, and in most cases as unavoidable, as perambulators and measles, find it difficult to think of the days of Vaughan's 'Doves' (p. 13) or of the conversational 'examination' attributed to the Bishop of Ely in 1830 (p. 8). But has there been perpetual progress ever since?

Prime responsibility for the emergence of Theological Colleges seems to have rested with the Tractarians—either because they founded some themselves, or because they provoked the Evangelicals into founding, by reaction, colleges pledged to the opposite ideals. Incidentally, the 'Awful Infidelity' of the Rationalists is also urged as an important contributory factor. Only later did the Liberal theological colleges emerge for those who could not feel comfortably housed in either of the other types. One question, however, had arisen very early: Should these colleges be in University towns? If so, what should be the relation between the University and the college? This is a question that recurs throughout the present volume, and many interesting views are recorded. Charles Perry, Fellow of Trinity

* *The History of Ridley Hall, Cambridge.* By F. W. B. Bullock, C.F., M.A., Ph.D., B.D. With a Foreword by the Right Rev. A. W. T. Perowne, D.D., Lord Bishop of Worcester. (Cambridge: Printed for the Council of Ridley Hall at the University Press. Copies obtainable only from the Principal, Ridley Hall, Cambridge.) (Volume I: to 1907. Price 18/-.)

(1841), James Hildyard, Tutor of Christ's (1841), the Earl of Harrowby (1877), Mr. Sydney Gedge (1879), Archbishop Tait (1880) are amongst those who favour theological colleges in University towns. Is it significant that it was an *anonymous* writer, 'Rusticus,' who set forward in a pamphlet to Perry and Hildyard the advantages of theological colleges in Cathedral Cities, and objected to the University as a place for such training as they ought to give?

As to the relation of a University and a theological college, the Introduction gives us much valuable information as to theological studies in Cambridge, and the views of the Divinity Professors there on the education of ordinands. It was Westcott and Lightfoot, let us notice, who

> 'acknowledged the need for . . . postgraduate training of men before taking Holy Orders,' but they themselves 'would take no active part' in the promotion of 'an Institution so definitely associated with the Evangelical School of thought, because they feared that party spirit might be engendered' (Foreword).

And when the Bishop of Worcester adds that at Ridley and Wycliffe Halls the 'Seminarist type of ordinand' has been avoided, he goes on to say,

> 'owing largely to the fact that at first only graduates of Cambridge and Oxford were accepted.'

Must we look then to the older Universities for breadth of theological vision?

What is now the special function of a theological college? Is it to teach theology? Or to teach pastoral work? Or to foster devotional life? Can it do all three at once? These are but a few of the questions that the book suggests, and one wishes sometimes that Dr. Bullock had not set as his ideal 'objective history,' though that was no doubt a very natural standpoint to try to adopt.

A book such as this will have at least two classes of interested readers: past and present members of Ridley, who will be grateful to Dr. Bullock for a volume worthy of the Hall's best traditions. Besides these, no one who is interested in the education and training of the clergy in general, or in the function of theological colleges, the relation of these to Universities, or in the history of theological study at Cambridge will spend their time with the book in vain. Those who, while not members of Ridley, have in Cambridge days enjoyed its hospitality, and Old Riponians—who will find references to John Battersby Herford, Vice-Principal of Ridley and later Principal of Ripon—will have an additional personal interest. Readers who find no interest in such a book as this will be those who have no interest in securing a pious, learned and useful clergy.

IAN RAMSEY.

GEORGE MEREDITH: A GERMAN VIEW *

'Of the making of books,' says Qoheleth, 'there is no end.' He wrote when the Jews were beginning to comment on their sacred texts, a process which was to end in leaving the Scriptures buried under cartloads of commentaries. So when we opened this review of what certain Germans say about Meredith, we did so with a measure of distaste. Would it not be better for the modern man to read Meredith for himself rather than to read what Mr. Guy B. Petter reports that certain Germans think of him? However, upon inspection the book turns out to be unexpectedly interesting, and it may possibly do something to revive the reputation, at present rather dormant, of Meredith.

What has become of Meredith? Stands his fame where it did? Admittedly it was of slow growth. He was fifty before he wrote the first of his novels to appeal to a wide public, *Diana of the Crossways,* and that was popular partly because it was generally understood to be a version of the life of Mrs. Norton, who had recently died; it had, like *Vanity Fair,* Thackeray's first real hit, the piquancy of a *roman au clef.* At the very end of his working life Meredith admitted that Richard le Gallienne had helped to make him generally known. But the very fact that he was, to use one of the *clichés* which he so abhorred, 'caviare to the general,' made a taste for Meredith a necessary part of the equipment of a literary gourmet. Chesterton and Mr. Priestley told the plain man that Meredith was quite orthodox and sound at bottom; it was usual to contrast his robust optimism with the sickly pessimism of Hardy.

The first Great War intensified the reaction against the Victorians which had begun before it; also it was the beginning of the end of the aristocratic society, the world in which the characters of Meredith moved and had their being. Doubtless, as the Victorian Age recedes into the past, it acquires historic interest; its furniture becomes antique, its typical figures seem quaint and amusing; only Meredith's characters are not the traditional Victorians like the characters in Dickens and Trollope; they are too intellectual. Robust optimism has its votaries to-day, as we may hear from the B.B.C., but they are mostly simple souls who prefer someone easier than Meredith, say Mr. J. B. Priestley.

Anti-German feeling may have had something to do with the slump in Meredith and with the marking down of Carlyle. Dr. Mertner points out that Meredith spent two years at school in Germany. The Doctor says that there was something in Meredith typically un-English, namely the emphatic preaching of a philosophy of life. 'Meredith learned at Neuwied to cultivate freedom of thought' (p. 153). This sounds odd to-day; it was written, how-

* *George Meredith and his German Critics,* by Guy B. Petter. (Witherby. 10/6.)

ever, in 1931, and Meredith was at school in Germany in 1843. In pre-Bismarckian Germany thought, abstract thought, was tolerably free, though, as Heine complained, it had little relation to action.

Meredith, Adam Brendel says, 'shows us the England of the middle nineteenth century, mighty, world-dominating; not yet palpitating with anxious fears of an impending German invasion' (p. 75). Certainly the British public in the 'fifties no more expected a German invasion than a Tatar invasion or a second Spanish Armada. Exeter Hall was rather apprehensive of an invasion of German 'teology.' But our ancestors in general pictured our Teutonic cousins as hairy intellectuals in spectacles, too fond of tobacco, metaphysics and beer, but otherwise inoffensive. Lord Palmerston, as we know from his letters, was convinced to his dying day that a French army must always beat a German one. Probably if Englishmen had read Meredith, Sedan would not have been such a staggering surprise; they might have suspected that the qualities which made Germans excel in Biblical criticism and Roman history might be turned to account in business and in the master-trade of war, that Germany might produce a Moltke as well as a Mommsen. But it would have taken more than a novel like *Henry Richmond* to open our eyes to the advantages of exact thought and scientific thoroughness.

Perhaps the best appreciation of Meredith in the volume comes from Philipp Aronstein, who may possibly be a non-Aryan. He points out that the emptiness and unreality of the conventional hero in the ordinary novel had wearied the more intelligent reader. Thackeray called *Vanity Fair* a novel without a hero.

> 'In modern realistic novels we find these heroes replaced by everyday people who are intentionally represented as weak and characterless: it is the *milieu* rather than the personality which predominates in the novels of Trollope and Gissing, and later of Wells, Bennett and Galsworthy. With Thomas Hardy, too, Fate is the hero, who pulverizes the poor creature entangled in the meshes through bad luck or a fault in his character. Meredith is an optimist, so with him the hero finds a place once more. His heroes are, as he says, real if unusual people, interesting, important personalities, who win through because they are active souls, and, though whipped by the storm, they struggle onward and upward' (p. 98).

As with heroes, we may add, so with heroines; only the traditional heroine was even more insipid. What could be more colourless than Rowena in *Ivanhoe?* Thackeray in his lively skit *Rowena and Rebecca* points out that the vital Jewess ought to have been the heroine and not the vapid Saxon. And yet, when he came to write a big novel, he made Amelia, the nineteenth century *bourgeoise* Rowena, the heroine of *Vanity Fair* and degraded Rebecca (Becky Sharp) into the villain of the piece. One wonders if he knew what he was doing: perhaps he did. Thackeray was, one fears, a

man of intellect and character who deliberately and reluctantly wrote down to his audience. Meredith had more independence if less worldly wisdom.

A good deal of the book is taken up with Meredith as the protagonist of the rights of women. While it would be entirely wrong to suppose that we have assimilated his teaching and gone beyond it, it is true that the particular phase of agitation for women's rights which bulked so large fifty years ago has come to seem out of date; the catchwords of those days are as unfashionable as their costumes. Substantial advances have been made towards the equality of the sexes; women are as free to go to the bad or to be blown to pieces by bombs as men are, and one wonders if they are any the happier for it. Woman's misuse of the right to vote seems as flagrant as man's; she is as ready a victim to the wiles of the would-be dictator as he. In any case, just now we do not want to hear about emancipation from the countrymen and countrywomen of Adolf Hitler. Meredith is in eclipse, old-fashioned enough to be out of date and not old enough to be a classic. Probably, nay, certainly, he will emerge; there is enough of the perennial in him to survive temporary obscuration. His appeal to an impartial posterity has yet to be heard.

GAMALIEL MILNER.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

THE REMEDIES OF MR. HARDWICK AND MR. WOOD.

SIR,

There are two matters in the March, 1941, issue of the *Modern Churchman* which call for comment. Mr. Wood has outlined the task of the Modern Churchman's Union as he perceives it. Mr. Hardwick has made a valuable comment upon the sacramental controversy.

To take Mr. Hardwick's point first, the religion of the average Englishman is not sacramental. There is much in history to justify this fact. The infrequency of the act of communion among the mediaeval laity is an important comment upon it. The centuries during which the Church of England did not treat the Communion service as its 'central' service were probably those in which it stood closest to the religious mind of the English people. The Oxford Movement revived a semi-Tridentine Catholicism. Dr. Pusey translated the post-Reformation Roman Catholic writers for use in the English Church. So far as the laity are concerned, it was largely clerical protest against liberalism and a priestly stressing of sacramental religion. It has utterly failed as a popular religious force. But it threw up the Wilberforce school of 'good Churchmen' who sought to preserve its sacramental stresses without the Tridentine theology. The result has been a wealth of muddle-headedness for which the characteristic timidity of popular Anglican theology must be blamed. As Mr. Hardwick truly says, the average Englishman is looking for an expert in religion. But here there is a marked difference between the ordinary orthodox layman

and the educated man. The one is lying upon the dead bones of the 'good Churchmanship' of Bishop Wilberforce. The other looks for an expert approach to his problems. The first will be satisfied with a watered sacramentalism and a moderate orthodoxy. The latter will demand an intellectual honesty which is not characteristic of 'good Churchmanship'.

The article by Mr. Wood raises the whole question of the future of the Modern Churchmen's Union. May I respectfully suggest that Mr. Hardwick's call for the expert supplies the key to the problem? It is not possible to revive the Church of England before its inherent liberality was defaced by the irrational emotionalism of the Evangelical Revival and the 'good Churchmanship' derived from the Oxford Movement. With the late Alfred Fawkes, I wish that it were possible, but historical causes stand against it. The need of the present time is for the radical modernist who will go to the roots of the problems of religion and will not content himself with the restatement of traditional formulae in the language of to-day. Modernism must answer the question as to whether it is possible to accept the ideas of God, prayer, immortality, in any accepted traditional sense. It must re-examine the place of Jesus in religion and decide anew whether the stereotyped picture is big enough to include the religious experiences of mankind. The task of the Modern Churchmen's Union is to give an expert lead in such problems.

Modern industrialism has produced a secular society which is not constructed in terms of the Christian values. There is an initial disintegration between religion and society. There is a further intellectual disintegration of orthodox religion and a semi-conscious demand for a reassessment of beliefs in the light of a fundamental attitude of faith. Science and the growth of factual knowledge have had an iconoclastic effect upon the minds of the educated classes. For the many, the nature of a civilization conditioned by the radio, the cinema, the cheap press, has acted as the solvent for any religious background to life. The aim of our times is dictated by the need for a reintegration between religion and the forms of society based upon beliefs which fit both the knowledge and the social content of the times. This end will not be achieved by any revival of semi-traditionalist ideas of sacramentalism. Roman Catholicism can at least appeal to a tradition and a culture which provides an alternative to that of modernity. The sort of revival for which Mr. Lindfield pleads lacks even this sanction. The task of the Modernist cannot lie in a revival which is foredoomed to failure at the start and which is in fundamental opposition to the natural developments of religion in this country. It is dictated by contemporary need for expertness and for a fundamental treatment of existing beliefs as pointers to an ultimate knowledge which somehow always eludes our grasp. It must be scientific in its treatment of the religious *data*. We must realize that we are not restricted by the confines of the Church of England as an organization, but by the religious desires and needs of the whole English people.

F. H. Amphlett Micklewright.

17 College Court,
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